​Shane Steichen didn’t exactly reinvent the wheel with that comment last year. Any team worth its salt will tell you that running the ball is essential to winning. That statement can mean a few different things. It could mean you want to establish a capable ground game to slow down the rush and protect the quarterback. It could also mean you need to run to keep your defense fresh by controlling time of possession, or at least by splitting those possessions with your opponent. Another angle is that a strong rushing attack can help salt away a game when you have a lead, or at least help you hold on when the outcome is still in doubt.
During our 7‑1 stretch last season, our philosophy of “pass to score and run to win” seemed to align most with the latter approach. We tended to throw in the first half while leaning on the run in the second half. Jonathan Taylor’s usage and statistics reflect that strategy. In the first halves of games, he was solid, recording 167 rushing attempts for 676 yards, averaging 4.0 yards per carry. He also played a significant role in the passing game early, with 32 targets, 25 receptions, and an average of 9.7 yards per catch. In the second halves, his workload dropped to 148 carries but yielded 872 yards, for 5.9 yards per carry. I suspect the reduced second‑half attempts were a result of our big leads, which allowed him to sit for portions of the fourth quarter. His receiving efficiency dropped in the second half, averaging 6.5 yards per catch on 21 receptions.
His production took a noticeable hit once we handed the reins to our second‑string quarterbacks. Over the final five games, he averaged only 3.1 yards per carry. It’s also worth noting that he logged 6.4 yards per carry across our eight wins and nearly 10 yards per reception, compared with 3.4 yards per carry and 6.5 yards per reception in our losses. Opponents clearly keyed in on Taylor once our passing game didn’t threaten them, suggesting that he benefited from a strategy built on using the pass to set up the run.
When we look at how the offense operated under center versus from shotgun, and our effectiveness with play action and the run‑pass option (RPO), the picture becomes even more interesting. Under center, Taylor carried the ball 157 times for an average of 5.4 yards per carry, and he was a standout receiver from that formation as well, averaging 10.8 yards per reception. Daniel Jones, operating under center, was less efficient, with a lower completion percentage—64.7% compared to 68.9% in shotgun—but he did excel in short yardage, rushing 26 times for five touchdowns and 13 first downs.
As for the RPO, I was surprised by how rarely we deployed it. Pro Football Reference notes that Taylor had only 20 rushing attempts for 66 yards on the season. Daniel Jones completed 39 of 52 RPO attempts and ran five times for 27 yards and three first downs. It makes you wonder how much we truly planned to lean into that element of the offense. There was speculation that Richardson would thrive in a system designed to feature him, but the overall usage suggested a more measured approach than a full‑throttle reliance on any single element of the package.